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to non-MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s. On average, each year
around one percent of workers in MNEs move to non-MNEs. By the year 2000,
45 percent of the non-MNEs employed workers with experience from MNEs. These
workers earned a wage premium of more than 3 percent compared to their new
colleagues in the non-MNEs. I estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function for non-
MNEs and include the share of workers with recent MNE experience. Consistent with
mobility being a channel for knowledge diffusion, I find that these workers contribute
20-25 percent more to productivity than workers without experience from MNEs.
The difference between the private returns to mobility and the productivity effect at
the plant level suggests that labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs represents a
true knowledge externality.
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1 Introduction
The empirical literature on knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment to host
country firms, treats the channels through which such spillovers may occur as a black box.
The labour mobility channel for spillovers has been highlighted both in theoretical models
(Fosfuri et al., 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002), and in the empirical literature (for recent
surveys of the empirical spillover literature, see Saggi, 2002 and Go¨rg and Greenaway,
2004). The general approach of the empirical spillover literature is to regress a measure
of domestic plant productivity on a measure of foreign presence at the industry level.
When measuring foreign presence at the industry level it is not possible to capture the
fact that domestic firms may have different links with foreign-owned firms. The more
contact domestic firms have with foreign-owned firms, the more likely they are to benefit
from spillovers. One type of contact with foreign-owned firms is to hire workers from these
firms. I use linked employer-employee data to construct plant-specific measures for the
share of workers in domestic plants with recent experience from multinationals. By using
this measure of an explicit link between domestic and multinational firms in a productivity
regression, I am able to go beyond the ‘black box’-treatment of spillovers in the existing
empirical literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to use extensive
linked employer-employee data to estimate the productivity effect of labour mobility from
foreign to domestic firms in a host country.
If labour mobility is a channel for spillovers from foreign to domestic firms, we would
expect to observe the following: First, we should observe a wage premium for employees
in foreign-owned firms, as this is one indication that foreign-owned firms have firm-specific
advantages that could be the basis for spillovers.1 Second, we should be able to document
a nontrivial magnitude of foreign to domestic labour mobility. Third, domestic plants that
hire workers with previous experience from foreign firms should benefit in terms of increased
productivity. Fourth, the foreign to domestic movers should benefit from mobility in terms
of their own wages, and their experience from foreign-owned firms should be valued in their
new firms. In this paper, I use linked employer-employee data to assess the evidence on all
four points for Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s.
The existence of a foreign wage premium combined with evidence of actual mobility
can only suggest that a potential for spillovers through labour mobility does exist, while
1A firm-specific advantage is primarily thought to give rise to a productivity advantage. Balsvik and
Haller (2006) find that foreign-owned firms in Norwegian manufacturing are more productive than domestic
firms. If firms share rents with their workers, or workers are paid according to their marginal productivity
this should also give rise to a wage premium in foreign-owned firms.
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a productivity benefit at the plant level due to mobility is consistent with labour mobility
actually working as a channel for spillovers. To what extent such spillovers can be regarded
as an externality, and not only as knowledge diffusion through market transactions, cannot
be determined from a positive productivity effect alone.2 An assessment of the size of the
productivity benefit together with information about the wage increase obtained by the
mobile workers may indicate to what extent a possible spillover is an externality. If the
productivity benefit at the plant level is larger than the wage premium granted to workers
with experience from MNEs, the evidence is consistent with a knowledge externality.
Foreign-owned firms are thought to be a relevant source of spillovers because they are
part of MNEs with firm-specific assets that can be transferred across borders within the
firm (Dunning, 1981; Markusen, 1995). It has recently been argued that the firm-specific
advantage hypothesis, which is thought to be a reason for firms becoming multinational,
should apply equally to domestic multinationals of the host country (Doms and Jensen,
1998; Bellak, 2004). The argument implies that the potential for spillovers should primar-
ily go from multinationals to purely local firms, regardless of whether a multinational is
foreign or domestically owned. The empirical analysis in this paper will distinguish mainly
between multinationals and local domestic plants, hereafter called MNEs and non-MNEs
respectively.
As a first exercise to assess the potential for knowledge spillovers from MNEs to non-
MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing, I estimate individual wage equations for manufactur-
ing workers. I control for plant and individual characteristics and include dummies for
foreign and domestic MNEs. I find a foreign MNE premium of 2,5% relative to non-MNEs,
while Norwegian MNEs seem to give a wage premium only to workers with high education.
Little is known about the extent and pattern of labour mobility between foreign and
domestic firms in a developed country, despite the frequent claim that it is a potential
channel for spillovers.3 Martins (2006) is the first to provide such evidence for a developed
country, using a large panel of linked employer-employee data that covers virtually all firms
and their employees in Portugal from 1986 to 2000. He finds relatively small labour flows
between foreign and domestic firms. In this paper I focus only on labour mobility within
manufacturing. Partly because labour mobility between manufacturing and other sectors of
the economy is likely to be lower than mobility within the manufacturing sector, and partly
2Møen (2005) argues that if the hiring firm pays wages according to the marginal productivity of the
new employee, a productivity benefit in the hiring firms is not an externality.
3Some case study evidence of foreign to domestic mobility in developing countries exists, see references
in Saggi (2002) and Go¨rg and Strobl (2005).
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because knowledge acquired in other sectors may be of limited relevance in manufacturing.
I find that on average, each year around 1% of workers in MNEs leave to join a non-MNE.
However, this translates into a growing percentage of workers in non-MNEs with experience
from MNEs. In the year 2000 15% of workers in non-MNEs had experience from MNEs,
while 45% of non-MNEs in 2000 employed one or more workers with MNE experience, up
from 18% in 1995. Thus, from the perspective of non-MNEs, labour mobility from MNEs
seems to be large enough to play a role as a channel for spillovers in Norway, at least during
the second half of the 1990s.
Given the extent of mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs, I proceed to estimate the
effect of this mobility on the productivity of non-MNEs. Previously, this has only been
examined empirically by Go¨rg and Strobl (2005), who use firm level data for a sample
of manufacturing plants in Ghana. They find that firms whose entrepreneurs worked in
multinationals in the same industry prior to joining or setting up their own firm are more
productive than other firms, while experience from multinationals in a different industry
has no effect on firm productivity. In contrast to the data from Ghana, I can determine the
recent work history of all workers in non-MNEs. I include annual plant level measures of
the share of workers with recent MNE experience in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Based on an interpretation provided by Griliches (1967, 1986), I find that workers with
MNE experience contribute 20-25% more to total factor productivity than workers without
experience from MNEs. This result is consistent with the idea that labour mobility from
MNEs to non-MNEs is a channel for spillovers.
When looking at the wages of movers compared to colleagues with similar characteristics
in their new plant, I find that movers from MNEs to non-MNEs with more than 3 years’
experience from MNEs receive a wage premium of almost 5% compared to stayers in non-
MNEs. Thus experience from MNEs is clearly valued in non-MNEs. For movers in the
other direction there is no such wage premium. These results are consistent with mobility
from MNEs to non-MNEs being a potential channel for spillovers. The difference in the
private returns to mobility for movers from MNEs to non-MNEs and the productivity effect
these movers have at the plant level, suggest that the hiring non-MNEs do not fully pay for
the value of these workers to the firm. Hence, labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs
seems to be a source of knowledge externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data sources,
followed by the empirical results regarding foreign wage premia in Section 3. Section 4
contains descriptive evidence of labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs in Norwegian
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manufacturing and Section 5 investigates whether non-MNEs that hire workers with MNE
experience benefit in terms of productivity. Section 6 asks whether movers benefit from
mobility in terms of wages, while Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
I use four different annual data bases for the years 1990-2000, all of which are censuses
that can be linked to each other by firm or plant identifiers. All the data sources are
administered by Statistics Norway. The starting point is the Norwegian Manufacturing
Statistics, which is collected at the plant level. From the Manufacturing Statistics, I use
information about production, input use, investment and industry classification (ISIC Rev.
2). As the main aim of the paper is to include measures of labour mobility into a plant
level productivity framework, plants with insufficient information to calculate a measure of
total factor productivity are excluded from the analysis. After this cleaning the remaining
data still contains around 90% of manufacturing output and employment.4
In order to classify plants as MNEs or non-MNEs, I combine information obtained
from the record of foreign ownership of equity in Norwegian firms (the so-called SIFON-
register), and information from the register of outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI)
from Norway. Both registers can be linked to the Manufacturing Statistics with firm
identifiers. The SIFON-register contains information about the value and shares of equity
owned by foreign interests, as well as the nationality of the largest owners.5 The register of
outward FDI contains information about shares and votes in operations abroad controlled
by Norwegian firms, country of operation and a number of financial transactions between
the owner in Norway and the operation abroad.6 For the purpose of classifying plants as
MNEs or non-MNEs, I use the information on the shares of equity in Norwegian firms
owned by foreigners from the SIFON-register, and the shares of equity in firms abroad
owned by firms in Norway. I define a Norwegian MNE as a firm that is not itself majority
owned from abroad, while it has direct ownership shares of more than 20% in operations
abroad. A foreign MNE is more than 20% foreign owned and at the same time not classified
as a Norwegian MNE.
4For more detailed descriptions of the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics, see Halvorsen et al. (1991)
and Møen (2004).
5See Simpson (1994) for more details about the SIFON-register.
6The register of outgoing FDI has hardly been used for research so far. Gru¨nfeld (2005) uses this
database to give an overview of foreign activities of firms based in Norway.
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Finally, I link the administrative files containing the whole population of residents aged
16-74 to the plant level data. The administrative files contain, among other things, infor-
mation on age, gender, identification of the current employer, weekly work-hours, annual
earnings, start and end dates for the current employment spell and detailed education
codes.7 Weekly work-hours are recorded as a categorical variable in 4 groups, with the
longest work-hours being 30 hours or more per week. I use only workers that are recorded
as working 30 hours or more per week, and call these workers full-time workers (more than
90% of workers are full-time workers). As a proxy for wages, I use the recorded earnings
variable in the data, where earnings are measured as annual taxable labour income.8
Table 1: Foreign and domestic plants and workers
Number of plants Mean empl. Full-time workers
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1990 5,211 249 216 27 83 179 141,435 20,634 38,719
1991 4,849 362 218 26 97 163 124,921 35,038 35,607
1992 4,739 390 240 25 96 161 119,181 37,474 38,677
1993 4,411 435 240 23 102 165 102,155 44,439 39,600
1994 4,455 497 219 24 92 177 106,481 45,742 38,815
1995 4,389 482 220 24 102 160 107,243 49,248 35,108
1996 4,296 512 203 24 103 151 101,375 52,715 30,651
1997 4,353 531 179 26 104 156 111,495 55,465 27,958
1998 4,282 639 159 26 94 179 111,109 60,254 28,384
1999 4,156 681 177 26 92 166 107,958 62,407 29,428
2000 3,923 689 215 26 88 128 100,231 60,615 27,421
Notes: 1=Non-MNE; 2=Foreign MNE; 3=Domestic MNE
Table 1 shows the total number of matched plants and full-time workers by type of
plant. The total number of manufacturing plants decreased from 5 200 in 1990 to 3 900 in
2000, and the total number of full-time workers went down from around 200 000 in 1990
to below 190 000 in 2000. While the number of Norwegian MNEs and non-MNEs and
the number of workers in these plants declined from 1990 to 2000, the number of foreign
MNEs and the number of workers in foreign MNEs tripled during the same period. Plants
of Norwegian MNEs are substantially larger in terms of the average number of workers
7See Salvanes and Førre (2003) for a general description of the Norwegian linked employer–employee
data sets, see also Møen et al. (2004) for documentation.
8For the analysis of wages in Sections 3 and 6 I drop 135 000 individual observations (6% of the sample),
where the recorded earnings are considered too low for a regular full time earning. I set this threshold to
be below 12 000 NOK per month in 2001 prices. Dropping these low-wage observations does not affect the
results.
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than plants of foreign MNEs.
3 Is there a multinational wage premium?
A potential for spillovers from MNEs to non-MNEs requires that the local firms have some-
thing to learn from MNEs. One piece of evidence that would suggest such a potential is
that MNEs pay higher wages than non-MNEs. Through on-the-job-experience (or train-
ing), workers in MNEs may get access to part of the MNE’s superior technology, and bring
valuable knowledge with them to a new employer. They may also set up a competing
business. In order to prevent such spillovers, the MNE may pay a wage premium to reduce
labour mobility, as discussed in the theoretical models of Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass
and Saggi (2002). In these models the MNE shares rents with its workers. MNEs may
also pay a wage premium because they are able to share rents across borders (Budd and
Slaughter, 2004). Other explanations for the wage premium are that it is a compensation
for a higher probability of plant closure (Bernard and Sjo¨holm, 2003), or higher labour
demand volatility (Fabri et al., 2003). Both these hypotheses of compensating differentials
are consistent with the existence of a foreign wage premium, but do not necessarily imply
that the MNE has a firm-specific advantage that could be the basis for spillovers.9
For Norwegian manufacturing there are clear differences in unconditional mean wages
between non-MNEs, domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs, see Figure 1. The difference
between non-MNEs and foreign MNEs is around 10%. From Table 2 we see that domestic
MNEs have on average more employees than foreign MNEs, and both types of MNEs
are substantially larger than non-MNEs. In terms of labour productivity and wages, the
domestic and foreign MNEs are relatively similar and both types of MNEs have higher
productivity and wages than non-MNEs. In terms of mean age, experience and years of
education of the workers, the three groups of plants seem very similar, though education
levels are slightly higher in MNEs than in non-MNEs. The biggest difference is found in
the length of tenure, where the Norwegian MNEs have considerably longer mean tenure
9Several papers investigate the extent of so-called wage-spillovers. Foreign direct investment by high
productivity firms might lead to increased wages by affecting labour demand directly, but there could also
be an indirect effect through knowledge diffusion. As noted by Aitken et al. (1996), labour turnover and
knowledge diffusion should eventually increase wages also in domestic firms and thus reduce or eliminate
the foreign wage premium (see also Barry et al., 2005). Indirect evidence of knowledge diffusion through
wage-spillovers is found for the US (Aitken et al., 1996) and the UK (Girma et al., 2001; Driffield and
Girma, 2003), while Aitken et al. (1996) find zero or even negative wage-spillovers for Venezuela and
Mexico. As these studies do not follow workers between plants, they cannot say whether labour mobility
played any role in facilitating the wage-spillovers.
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Figure 1: Wages in MNEs and non-MNEs
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(9.3 years) than both foreign MNEs (8 years) and domestic non-MNEs (7.3 years). The
main reason for this difference is likely to be the age of the plants; the larger Norwegian
MNEs are likely to be older than the other groups of plants. The mean tenure of foreign
MNEs is to some extent affected by the recent entry of many of these plants.
When using plant level data for average wages it is a common finding that foreign
firms pay higher average wages than domestically owned firms, and that the foreign wage
premium is larger in developing countries than in developed countries.10 In many plant
level datasets it is not possible to control for the quality of the labour force when estimating
the foreign wage premium, thus part of the wage premium may be due to foreign firms using
more skilled labour than domestic firms. Studies of foreign wage premia using individual
wage data typically find smaller wage premia than studies using only plant level average
wages. This result suggests that part of the plant level premium can be explained by skill
composition.
I estimate wage premia and control for both plant and individual observable character-
istics in the following wage regression:
wijt = β0 + β1Djt +X
′
ijtβ2 + F
′
jtβ3 + eit, (1)
10Aitken et al. (1996) provide evidence for Mexico, Venezuela and the United States. Lipsey and
Sjøholm (2004) provide evidence for Indonesia, and evidence of foreign wage premia in UK manufacturing
are found by Conyon et al. (2002), Girma et al. (2001) and Griffith and Simpson (2003).
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Table 2: Worker and plant characteristics: Means of annual values 1990-2000
Non-MNEs Foreign MNEs Domestic MNEs
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Real monthly wage 23,513 13,078 26,631 11,580 25,102 15,182
Tenure 7.33 6.10 7.95 6.48 9.28 6.56
Experience 22.23 12.72 22.36 12.34 22.55 12.59
Age 40.08 11.74 40.59 11.26 40.72 11.52
Years of schooling 10.54 2.37 10.92 2.74 10.87 2.56
Plant size 30.39 68.65 106.23 185.59 164.14 234.85
Labour Productivity 1224 1635 2068 8299 1817 1363
Skill share 0.36 0.22 0.44 0.21 0.39 0.19
Female share 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.27 0.22
Worker/Plant obs. 1,215,480/48,820 516,450/5,450 365,390/2,270
Notes: Experience=age-years of education-7, labour productivity is real output per
employee, skill share is share of workers with more than 11 years of education.
where wijt is the log real wage of worker i employed in firm j at time t, Xijt is a vector of
observable individual characteristics and Fjt is a vector of observable plant characteristics,
while eit is an idiosyncratic error term. The main variable of interest is Djt, which is a
dummy indicating the status of the plant.
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (1) with OLS for Norwegian man-
ufacturing workers. In the upper part of the table, I analyse wage differences between
foreign and domestic plants. Djt is a dummy for foreign ownership. The lower part of the
table shows results for wage differences between MNEs and non-MNEs. In this case, the
foreign ownership dummy is replaced by 2 dummies, one indicating whether the plant is a
domestic MNE and the other indicating whether the plant is a foreign MNE. Columns 1-5
show results using the full panel with additional sets of control variables in each column.
By comparing results in Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3, we can see that differences in
observable plant characteristics are more important than the observable individual charac-
teristics of workers. The foreign wage premium is reduced by almost 50% between Column
2 and Column 3, and only plant characteristics account for the difference between these
columns. Adding individual characteristics in Column 4 has hardly any further effect on
the wage premium.
Column 6 shows the result from the model in Column 5, when the estimating sample
includes only individuals with less than 11 years of education. The result in Column 7
is for individuals with more than 15 years of education. The unconditional foreign wage
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premium is around 10% in Column 1, and falls to 2.3% in Column 5 after adding industry
dummies, plant and individual characteristics. This is comparable to the 2% premium
found by Heyman et al. (2004) for Sweden in a very similar regression, while for Portugal,
Martins (2004) finds a foreign wage premium of around 10% when controlling for both
individual and plant characteristics. An interesting feature in the lower part of Table 3
is that domestic MNEs have lower wage premia than foreign MNEs. When controlling
for both plant and individual characteristics in Column 5, there is no wage premium in
domestic MNEs while foreign MNEs have a premium of 2.4%. This contrasts the findings
of Heyman et al. (2004), who find no significant difference in wage premia between foreign
and domestic MNEs, and find a wage premium of 5% for foreign MNEs relative to non-
MNEs in Sweden. In Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3, we can see that foreign MNEs pay
higher wages than non-MNEs to both educational groups, while domestic MNEs only have
a significant premium for the high education group. This premium is about half the size
of that in foreign MNEs.11
The wage regressions in Table 3 do not control for unobserved individual or firm-fixed
effects. The results are therefore likely to be affected by omitted variable bias. On the
one hand, if MNEs to a larger extent tend to select ‘better’ workers along unobserved
dimensions, this may explain part of the wage premium. On the other hand, if MNEs
systematically select better workers than non-MNEs, they may also be able to use their
human resources more efficiently. And the demand for ‘good’ workers may be connected
with their MNE status. In addition, foreign MNEs may perform better along unobserved
plant dimensions that increase their ability to pay higher wages. The results in Table 3
indicates that to control for observable plant characteristics has more effect on the wage
premium than to control for observable individual characteristics. Therefore it is likely
that the remaining wage premium is partly due to unobservable plant effects connected
with MNE status. This is consistent with the wage premium indicating a potential for
spillovers from this group of plants.
11Comparable OLS regressions using plant level average wages as the dependent variable show a some-
what higher wage premium of 5% for foreign plants when controlling for plant characteristics, labour
productivity, year and industry dummies. Similar to the individual wage regressions, if we replace the
foreign dummy with separate dummies for foreign and domestic MNEs, there is no significant domestic
MNE wage premium, while the foreign MNE premium is 4.5%.
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4 The extent of labour mobility
In the matched panel from 1990-2000 we observe in total about 450 000 individuals working
in manufacturing plants. Most of these individuals stay in the same plant all the years they
are observed in a manufacturing industry, but around 20% of the workers change plants
within manufacturing and generate around 110 000 incidents of plant change. Table 4 shows
that almost 45% of these plant changes occur between non-MNEs. For the group of workers
with low education this percentage is 48%, while only 27% of the job changes among the
university educated workers occur between non-MNEs. For the university educated, the
largest share of plant moves (39%) occurs between MNEs.12 The flows of workers between
MNEs and non-MNEs are roughly equal in both directions for all types of workers, thus
the potential for spillovers through labour mobility seems equally large in both directions.
Table 4: Direction of mobility for incidents of plant change
Education
All 1 2 3
Between non-MNEs 44.86 48.56 43.22 27.10
From non-MNE to MNEs 16.51 16.29 16.72 17.10
From MNE to non-MNEs 13.43 12.45 14.29 16.29
Between MNEs 25.20 22.70 25.77 39.51
Total moves (=100%) 110,377 61,736 39,431 9,210
Notes: 1=Non-technical education; 2=Vocational/technical education;
3=University education.
Table 5 shows for each of the three groups of plants (non-MNEs, foreign MNEs and
domestic MNEs) where workers that were employed in t-1 are found the following year.
This indicates the size of the mobility flows relative to the size of the plants. Concentrating
on the columns for workers with low education, we see that on average 77.3% of the workers
in non-MNEs with low education are employed in the same plant from one year to the next.
A total of 80% of these workers are still found within manufacturing. The remaining 20%
not accounted for in the table have left manufacturing for jobs in other sectors, are out of
the labour force or unemployed. Mobility is slightly lower in foreign and domestic MNEs
than in non-MNEs, 80.7% of low education workers in domestic MNEs continue in the same
12I have divided the workers into 3 groups based on detailed educational codes from Statistics Norway.
Group 1, the low-education group, includes individuals with missing education code and workers that have
completed up to 1 year of education after compulsory schooling. In addition, this group includes workers
with completed high school without technical fields. Group 2 includes workers with technical/vocational
education at the high school level, while group 3 includes workers with university education.
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plant from one year to the next. The lower mobility in MNEs is likely to be connected
to the size of the plants, as bigger plants have more of an internal labour market, and
also a lower probability of exit. The lower mobility in domestic MNEs correspond to the
longer tenure in these plants compared to non-MNEs, as revealed in Table 2. Workers with
university education are substantially less mobile than workers with lower education. On
average, around 85% of workers with university education stay in the same plant from one
year to the next. This might indicate that workers with high education accumulate plant
specific human capital to a larger extent than other workers.
Table 5: Within manufacturing mobility: Mean of annual values 1991-2000
Low education Vocational University
Nt % of Nt−1 Nt % of Nt−1 Nt % of Nt−1
Workers in non-MNEs in year t-1, are in year t found in:
Same Plant 65,527 77.3 26,139 80.7 4,351 86.0
Non-MNE 1,681 2.0 983 3.0 141 2.8
Domestic MNE 192 0.2 110 0.3 28 0.6
Foreign MNE 358 0.4 282 0.9 57 1.1
% of Nt−1 in manufacturing 80.0 84.9 90.5
Workers in foreign MNEs in year t-1, are in year t found in:
Same Plant 23,106 78.7 12,241 81.8 3,699 85.4
Foreign MNE 317 1.1 223 1.5 90 2.3
Non-MNE 267 0.9 231 1.5 58 1.3
Domestic MNE 74 0.3 62 0.4 28 0.7
% of Nt−1 in manufacturing 81.0 85.1 89.7
Workers in domestic MNEs in year t-1, are in year t found in:
Same Plant 17,944 80.7 9,278 84.2 2,284 85.0
Domestic MNE 353 1.5 290 2.7 76 2.9
Non-MNE 115 0.6 100 0.9 31 1.1
Foreign MNE 112 0.5 92 0.8 33 1.2
% of Nt−1 in manufacturing 83.3 88.6 90.2
Table 5 also indicates the presence of ‘internal labour markets’ within the group of
multinational plants, in particular for domestic MNEs. On average 719 workers move from
domestic MNEs to other domestic MNEs each year, while only 246 move from domestic
MNEs to non-MNEs .13 This gives a ratio of almost 3 movers from domestic MNEs to other
13From the lower part of Table 5 we find 719 by adding 353+290+76 from the row indicating movers to
domestic MNEs, similarly we find 249 by summing along the row of movers to non-MNEs.
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domestic MNEs for each mover to a non-MNE. A rather different ratio from the average of
less than 1 worker in domestic MNEs per 3 workers in non-MNEs, which can be calculated
from Table 1. Movers from foreign MNEs spread evenly between other foreign MNEs and
non-MNEs, with a ratio of approximately 1.1. Hence, workers in domestic MNEs tend
to move within this group of plants to a much larger extent than their share of workers
would suggest. This tendency is not so pronounced for movers from foreign MNEs.14 One
explanation for this feature is that domestic MNEs are more likely to be part of multi-plant
firms, with workers moving between plants within the firm.
Table 6: Workers in non-MNEs with experience from MNEs
All Education
1 2 3
1995
Experience from MNE 5.9 5.2 7.4 7.9
Experience from domestic MNE 2.8 2.3 3.7 4.0
Experience from foreign MNE 3.2 2.9 3.7 4.1
Total workers 113,862 77,422 32,144 4,296
2000
Experience from MNE 15.1 12.4 19.2 22.1
Experience from domestic MNE 6.1 4.9 7.5 9.9
Experience from foreign MNE 10.4 8.4 13.4 15.3
Total workers 107,502 68,959 26,617 11,926
Notes: Numbers in percent. 1 = Non-technical education;
2 = Vocational/technical education; 3 = University degree
From Table 5 we find that on average, each year around 800 workers in MNEs move to
non-MNEs.15 This only accounts for about 1% of the workers in MNEs, cf. Table 1. This
may suggest that the potential for knowledge diffusion is small. MNEs are far larger than
non-MNEs, however. The mobility flows from MNEs may therefore look more important
from the perspective of non-MNEs. Table 6 shows the percentage of workers in non-MNEs
in 1995 and 2000 with recent experience from MNEs. Recent MNE experience is defined
as having worked in an MNE for one or more of the last three years. Thus, a worker
must have worked in a multinational for one or more of the years 1997-1999 to be counted
14Martins (2006), in his study of foreign to domestic labour mobility in Portugal, finds similar evidence
of ‘internal labour markets’ within the group of foreign firms.
15We reach this number by summing along the row indicating movers from foreign MNEs to non-
MNEs (267+231+58), and by summing along the row of movers from domestic MNEs to non-MNEs
(115+100+31).
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as having MNE experience in 2000. In 1995 only 5.9% of the workers in non-MNEs had
experience from MNEs, and this was roughly equally divided between foreign and domestic
MNE experience. In 2000 15.1% of workers in non-MNEs had experience from MNEs, the
majority from foreign MNEs. The percentage of workers with experience from domestic
and foreign MNEs respectively, do not sum to the percentage of workers with overall MNE
experience (15.1%), because some of the workers may have experience from both types of
MNEs. The largest increase in the incidence of MNE experience has come in the group
of workers with university education. 22.1% of these workers had recent experience from
MNEs in 2000, the majority with experience from foreign MNEs.
Table 7 shows the percentage of non-MNEs in 1995 and 2000 that employed workers
with recent experience from MNEs. When comparing Tables 6 and 7 we see that although
the percentage of workers with recent MNE experience is small, the percentage of plants
employing such workers is much larger, 17.9% in 1995 (against 5.9% of workers) and 45.2%
in 2000 (against 15.1% of workers). While at the individual level, the share of workers
with MNE experience among the university educated in 2000 is larger than for the other
groups, the picture is the opposite at the plant level. The percentage of plants that employ
university educated workers with experience from MNEs is only 14.2% in 2000, while the
share of university educated workers with MNE experience is 22.1%. Hence it is a rather
small subset of non-MNEs that employ workers with university education.
Table 7: Non-MNEs employing workers with MNE experience
All Education
1 2 3
1995
Experience from MNE 17.9 11.6 10.4 3.1
Experience from domestic MNE 8.0 4.6 4.6 1.5
Experience from foreign MNE 12.8 8.2 6.9 1.9
2000
Experience from MNE 45.2 33.3 25.5 14.2
Experience from domestic MNE 24.7 15.6 12.2 6.7
Experience from foreign MNE 37.6 26.3 20.7 10.7
Notes: Numbers in percent. 1 = Non-technical education;
2 = Vocational/technical education; 3 = University degree
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5 Productivity spillovers through labour mobility?
The evidence presented in Section 4 shows relatively small mobility flows. However, in
terms of the potential for mobility to generate spillovers that affect plant productivity,
the interesting issue is how the workers with MNE experience spread across the group of
non-MNEs. The previous section also showed that during the 1990s there was a growing
and fairly substantial percentage of plants that employed workers with previous experience
from MNEs. I now proceed to investigate whether labour mobility gives rise to productivity
effects at the plant level.
The empirical spillover literature surveyed by Go¨rg and Greenaway (2004) has looked for
evidence of productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms by regressing a measure
of domestic plant productivity on a number of covariates, including a measure of foreign
presence in the industry or region. As argued by Go¨rg and Strobl (2005), this approach
treats the channels through which spillovers may occur as a black box. A measure of
foreign presence at the industry level is not able to capture the fact that firms within
the same industry have different degrees of contact with foreign firms.16 Domestic firms
with explicit contacts with foreign firms may be the most likely to benefit from knowledge
diffusion. Examples of contacts between foreign and domestic firms could, in addition to
labour mobility, be technology licensing, R&D cooperation, or exchange of intermediate
inputs. Unfortunately, information at the firm or plant level on such links between MNEs
and non-MNEs is rarely available.17 Go¨rg and Strobl (2005) use information on whether
the owners of domestic firms have previous experience from MNEs, and this firm-specific
link between domestic firms and multinationals has a positive effect on the productivity of
domestic firms in their sample of manufacturing firms from Ghana.
With the Norwegian data I am able to construct plant-specific measures for the shares
of workers in non-MNEs with recent experience from MNEs, and I include this measure
in a Cobb-Douglas production function. The interpretation of the coefficient on the share
of workers with MNE experience is based on Griliches (1967). He argues that in a Cobb-
Douglas production function one could ask whether different types of labour are equally
16If foreign presence is measured in the same industry as the domestic plants are located, this measure
picks up intra-industry (also called horizontal-) spillovers (see e.g. Haddad and Harrison ,1993; Aitken and
Harrison, 1999; Keller and Yeaple, 2002; Kinoshita, 2001). Regressions that include foreign presence in
upstream or downstream industries from the domestic plants pick up inter-industry (also called vertical-)
spillovers (Kugler, 2006; Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2004).
17Studies that find evidence consistent with spillovers through vertical linkages (e.g. Smarzynska-
Javorcik, 2004) use aggregate input output tables to generate the variables representing the links between
foreign and domestic firms, but these are not firm specific links.
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‘potent’ in generating productivity growth.18 I apply this idea to labour with recent ex-
perience from MNEs (LM) and labour without such experience (LN). Under the spillover
hypothesis, we would expect that LM should be weighted by a positive ‘premium’ δ in the
production function. With two types of labour in the production function, effective labour
L∗ is
L∗ = LN + LM(1 + δ) = L(1 + δs),
where s = LM/L is the share of labour with MNE experience in the total use of labour, L =
LN+LM . Given a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = (K)
βK (M)βM (L∗)βL , the βL lnL∗
term in its log linearized version can be approximated by βL lnL+βLδs, and we can estimate
the following production function
lnYit = βK lnKit + βM lnMit + βL lnLit + βLδsit + υi + vt + εit. (2)
In equation (2) lnY , lnK, lnM , and lnL are the natural logs of output, capital, material
and hours in plant i, year t.19 sit is the share of workers that have experience from MNEs,
υi and vt are plant and time fixed effects. When constructing the measures of sit, I require
the MNE experience of workers in non-MNEs to be relatively recent, i.e. for a worker to
be counted as having MNE experience in year t, the worker had to work in a multinational
for one or more of the years t−3 to t−1.20 Since βL is estimated separately, the combined
βLδ term can be used to compute the δ term.
21
Table 8 presents results of estimating equation (2) with plant fixed effects on the sample
of non-MNEs. 28 industry dummies corresponding to ISIC 3-digit level and year dummies
are added in all regressions. In Column 1, sit is the share of workers in the plant with
recent experience from both foreign and domestic MNEs. The coefficient on the share of
workers with MNE experience is positive and significant. In Column 2, the measure of MNE
18Griliches (1986) applies this idea to different types of R&D expenditure.
19For variable construction, see the variable definitions in the Appendix.
20This corresponds to the definition of recent MNE experience used in Tables 6 and 7 in Section 4.
21L is measured as total man-hours in the plant. This variable is from the Manufacturing Statistics.
The share of workers with MNE experience is constructed from the matches between fulltime workers
from the employee data and plants in the Manufacturing Statistics. The use of L together with the
share s means that I assume that the share of matched workers with MNE experience approximates
the share of hours by workers with MNE experience. At the aggregate manufacturing level the match of
individuals to plants generates total manufacturing employment that corresponds to what we would get by
using the employment information from the Manufacturing Statistics. At the plant level, the employment
correspondence is more variable, thus I prefer to use the hours variable from the Manufacturing Statistics
in the production function rather than constructing labour input from the number of individuals that I
match to the plant level data.
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experience is split into two parts; the shares of workers with experience from foreign and
domestic MNEs, respectively. In this case both coefficients are positive, but not significant.
More than 30% of plants that employ workers with domestic MNE experience also employ
workers with foreign MNE experience, and this makes it difficult to identify the separate
effects of foreign and domestic MNE experience. In Column 3, the workers with MNE
experience are split by education, this time only the small group of university educated
individuals is distinguished from the rest. In this case, only the coefficient on the largest
group of workers with MNE experience, those without university education, is significant.
Table 8: Share of workers with MNE experience and plant productivity
Dependent variable: Log(Output)
1 2 3
Share of workers with MNE-exp. .096∗
(.037)
Share of workers with foregin MNE-exp. .069
(.037)
Share of workers with domestic MNE-exp. .115
(.078)
Share with MNE-exp. and low education .100∗∗
(.038)
Share with MNE-exp. and high education .038
(.175)
Log(Capital) .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Materials) .507∗∗∗ .507∗∗∗ .507∗∗∗
(.007) (.007) (.007)
Log(Hours) .355∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008)
N 33,405 33,405 33,405
R-sq .83 .83 .83
δ .270∗
(.107)
Notes: All regressions include year dummies and 28 industry dummies. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗=
significant at 0.1, 1 and 5%, respectively. Standard errors clustered on plants in
parentheses.
We can calculate the implied δ from the fixed effect results in Column 1 by combining
the estimated coefficient on labour and the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE
experience. The implied δ with its standard error is found at the bottom of Column 1.
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δ = 0.27, which means that workers with experience from MNEs contribute on average 27%
more to the total factor productivity of the plant than workers without such experience.
The effect is significant at the 5% level.
I have also estimated equation (2) by dropping 2-digit sectors one by one. The estimated
coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is in all cases of the same order of
magnitude as in Column 1 of Table 8. It is also significant at the 5% level in all cases except
when I drop the machinery and equipment industry. In that case the coefficient on the
share of workers with MNE experience is significant at the 10% level. This suggests that
the spillover effect from labour mobility is particularly strong in the Norwegian machinery
and equipment sector. This is the largest manufacturing sector in Norway and employs
around 35% of all manufacturing workers.
Table 9 includes the results for the estimated coefficient on the share of workers with
MNE experience (cf. Column 1 of Table 8) from a number of different robustness checks.
All regressions are estimated using the fixed effects (within effects) method. The first
six rows of Table 9 repeat different variations of the regression presented in Column 1 of
Table 8. The first two rows add control variables that are commonly used in the empirical
literature on spillovers from FDI. These include foreign presence measured as the share of
employment in foreign firms at the 5-digit industry level in Row 1, and variables to control
for industry competition in Row 2.22 In Row 3 I control for turnover and skill share at
the plant level, since the hiring of workers with MNE experience could be systematically
related to these variables. An alternative way to control for human capital is to replace
the hours variable with a better measure of human capital at the plant level. I do this by
multiplying hours with the average education level of the plant, and present the result in
Row 4 of Table 9. As the result in Table 8 implies decreasing returns to scale, the regression
in Row 5 of Table 9 imposes constant returns to scale in the production function. In this
case the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is reduced, but is still
significant at the 10% level. The implied δ in the constant returns to scale estimation is
0.18; also significant at the 10% level. In Row 6 I use the lagged share of workers with
MNE experience instead of the current share when estimating equation (2). This is to
account for the likely possibility that the effect of the new workers on productivity may
take time to materialise. When comparing Column 1 of Table 8 and the first six rows of
Table 9, we see that the result is not affected by these alternative specifications. In all cases
the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is positive and significant and
22The competition variables were first proposed by Nickell (1996) and include market shares, profit
margins, industry concentration and a measure of import competition.
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implies a productivity premium of 24 to 28%. The exception is the regression imposing
constant returns to scale in the production function, but even here the result is significant
at the 10% level and implies a productivity premium for workers with MNE experience of
almost 20% compared to workers without such experience.
Table 9: Robustness: Estimated coefficient on share of workers with MNE experience
MNE-exp. N R-Sq δ
1. Industry level of foreign presence .096∗ (.037) 33,405 .83 .27∗ [.011]
2. Competition variables .1∗∗ (.037) 33,405 .83 .28∗∗ [.008]
3. Plant level skillshare and turnover .093∗ (.037) 33,405 .83 .26∗ [.014]
4. Plant level human capital .082∗ (.038) 33,387 .83 .24∗ [.033]
5. Impose constant returns to scale .072 (.038) 33,405 .89 .18 [.062]
6. Lagged share of MNE-exp .089∗ (.035) 25,619 .81 .25∗ [.011]
7. 3-digit industry input coefficients .086∗∗ (.031) 33,405 .85
8. Dummy for MNE-exp .015∗∗∗ (.003) 33,405 .83
9. TFP as dependent variable .308∗∗∗ (.059) 33,405 .07
10. Levinsohn-Petrin residuals .077∗ (.033) 28,777 .05
11. Labour productivity .2∗ (.085) 33,405 .04
Notes: Rows 1-6 are different variations of the regression in Column 1 of Table 8 where the dependent
variable is log(output). Log(output) is also dependent variable in Rows 7-8, but δ cannot be calcu-
lated. In Rows 9-11 the dependent variables are different productivity measures which are regressed
on the share of workers with MNE experience, year and industry dummies. Standard errors in round
brackets, P-values in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗= significant at 0.1, 1 and 5%, respectively.
Rows 7-11 of Table 9 includes regressions that differ from the specification in equation
(2), thus we cannot calculate the implied productivity premium for workers with MNE
experience, but only estimate the effect of the share of workers with MNE experience in
an augmented production function framework. Row 7 reports the result of a more general
specification of the production function in equation (2) where the coefficients on capital,
materials and hours are allowed to vary across 3-digit industries. In Row 8 of Table 9
the share of workers with MNE experience is replaced with a dummy equal to one if the
plant employs one or more workers with MNE experience. This departs from the assumed
linear relationship between the share of workers with MNE experience and plant level
productivity that is implicit in equation (2). The estimated coefficient on the dummy is
positive and significant at the 0.1% level.23 In the last three rows of Table 9, I regress three
23The robustness checks in Rows 1-7 of Table 9 would all give a positive and significant coefficient at
the 1 or 0.1% level if the share of workers with MNE experience is replaced by a dummy variable as in
Row 8.
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different measures of plant level productivity on the share of workers with MNE experience
while including year and industry dummies. The TFP-index used in Row 9 is described in
the Appendix. In Row 10 I use the residuals from estimating a Cobb-Douglas production
function at the 2-digit industry level according to the method proposed by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003). The method is developed in order to address the simultaneity problem
in estimates of production functions.24 The last row of Table 9 uses labour productivity
measured as the log of output per hour as the dependent variable. In Rows 9-11, the results
point in the same direction as before; the estimated coefficients on the share of workers with
MNE experience are positive and significant. Thus the positive effect of MNE experience
on plant level productivity is robust to several different measures of productivity.
To summarize, the estimation results suggest that workers with MNE experience con-
tribute in the order of 20-25% more to the productivity of their plants than their colleagues
without such experience. The mean share of workers with recent MNE experience is 7.7%
for those non-MNEs that have workers with MNE experience, thus evaluated at the mean,
these plants have 1.5-2% higher TFP than plants that have not recruited workers with
MNE experience.
6 Do workers benefit from mobility?
The results of the previous section indicated that workers with experience from MNEs
are very important for the productivity of non-MNEs, and as such we would expect these
workers to be rewarded in their new plants. The potential process of spillovers through
labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs is similar to the process of R&D spillovers
through labour mobility. The literature on R&D spillovers and labour mobility uses a
human capital framework and focuses in particular on the relationship between mobility
and wages. Since at least part of the knowledge acquired in a firm will move with the
worker in the case of mobility, workers that get access to training/knowledge should be
willing to pay for this by accepting a current pay cut in expectation of future private
returns (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983).25
24An alternative method to control both for unobserved plant fixed effects and input simultaneity is to
use the GMM-System estimator recently developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For a recent application
to the question of whether foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic firms, see Benfratello
and Sembenelli (2006). I have tried variations of the GMM-System estimator using different lags of inputs
and output as instruments. In all cases the validity of the instrument set was rejected.
25I find no evidence that workers in MNEs pay for the knowledge they accumulate on the job through
lower wages early in their career. Møen (2005) finds the opposite result for technical staff in R&D-intensive
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Table 10 shows mean wage growth in percent from the year before moving to the year
after moving for different groups of movers. Their wage growth is also compared to the
mean annual wage growth of workers who never change plant (stayers). The average wage
growth of stayers is around 3% per year, while the movers experience wage growth of
more than 5% upon moving from their old plant to a new one. Workers that change
from a MNE to a non-MNE experience on average a wage growth of 7.2%, while the wage
growth for movers in the opposite direction is 8.1%. These growth rates are higher than
for workers that change plants within the group of MNEs or non-MNEs (5.6 and 5.7%).26
The difference between average wage growth in the year of moving compared to annual
average wage growth in the sample indicates that most job changes are voluntary, and
that the movers increase their wage as a result of moving. This is consistent with the view
that workers are attracted to their new plants by a deliberate policy by the hiring plant to
acquire new workers to get access to their knowledge. It is also consistent with the view
that the moving workers are earning a private return on general training received by the
previous employer, and that this return is larger with a new employer who has not paid
any of the training costs (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999).
Table 10: Characteristics of movers and stayers
Movers from MNEs Movers from non-MNEs Stayers
non-MNEs MNEs non-MNE MNE non-MNEs MNEs
Wage before move 24,967 26,161 23,275 24,336 23,228 25,606
Wage after move 26,023 27,086 23,872 25,439 23,156 25,728
Wagechange % 7.2 5.5 5.8 8.1 3.0 3.3
Tenure 4.3 6.4 4.6 4.0 8.6 9.1
Age 35.0 37.9 36.4 35.2 41.1 40.8
Education 11.2 11.2 10.7 11.0 10.4 10.9
N 6,744 15,206 22,836 8,556 559,459 310,050
In Table 10 the wage growth for MNE to non-MNE movers and for non-MNE to MNE
movers is very similar. In fact, the movers from non-MNEs to MNEs experience on average
a larger wage jump than movers in the other direction.27 As the wage growth numbers
in Table 10 are unconditional means, they may be systematically affected by the charac-
firms in the Norwegian machinery and equipment industry.
26Martins (2006) and Pesola (2006) investigate the private returns to mobility from foreign to domestic
firms in Portugal and Finland, respectively. In Portugal foreign to domestic movers on average experience
a pay cut upon moving, while the opposite is the case in Finland.
27One possible explanation is that the MNEs may be actively seeking to attract good workers from
non-MNEs as a form of technology sourcing.
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teristics of the movers or the plants they move between. For instance, when interpreting
the wage growth of 8.1% for movers from non-MNEs to MNEs, we must bear in mind
that most of these moves mean that the worker moves from a small plant to a larger plant
(as the average size of MNEs is much larger than for non-MNEs). And since wages are
positively correlated with plant size, the change in plant size may be an important factor
in explaining the wage growth for non-MNE to MNE movers.
In order to investigate further the extent to which the movers may be selected out of
their old plants and into their new plants, I follow the approach of Martins (2006). He
compares the wages of foreign to domestic movers to the wages of their colleagues that do
not move plants. He does this both before and after moving by estimating the following
wage regression
wijt = β0 + β1DMij + β2DNij +X
′
ijtβ3 + F
′
jtβ4 + dj + eit. (3)
wijt is the log real wage of worker i employed in firm j at time t, Xijt is a vector of
observable individual characteristics, Fjt is a vector of observable plant characteristics, dj
is a plant fixed effect, while eit is an idiosyncratic error term.
When comparing the wages of movers from MNEs before moving to wages of stayers in
MNEs, DMij is a dummy equal to 1 if worker i of plant j moves to a MNE in the future,
while DNij equals 1 if the worker moves to a non-MNE in the future.
28 The results,
presented in the first two columns of Table 11, indicate that future movers to non-MNEs,
are paid no differently than their fellow workers who will stay in the plant. There is no
difference in the results from OLS and fixed effects between Columns 1 and 2. By contrast,
workers who move to other MNEs in the future earn a premium of about 1,5%. The result
is unaffected by including plant fixed effects. The lack of difference between the OLS and
fixed effect results indicates that the wage premium is not caused by movers from MNEs
to other MNEs coming from high-wage MNEs.
I next use equation (3) to compare the wages of movers from non-MNEs before moving
to wages of stayers in non-MNEs, and the results are presented in the last two columns
of Table 11. Movers from non-MNEs to other non-MNEs are not paid differently from
their fellow workers before moving, while movers from non-MNEs to MNEs receive a wage
premium compared to stayers in non-MNEs. This wage premium is 2.9% with OLS es-
timation, but falls to 1,2% when taking account of plant fixed effects, thus part of the
28Martins (2006) only considers movers from foreign to domestic firms and therefore uses only one
dummy.
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wage premium found with OLS estimation is due to MNEs recruiting from high-wage local
plants.29 In terms of the potential for knowledge diffusion, the evidence of a wage pre-
mium for future movers from non-MNEs to MNEs points more in the direction of MNEs
being better placed to benefit from mobility spillovers, since they are able to select better
workers.
Table 11: Before moving: Wages of movers vs stayers in old plant
Movers from MNEs Movers from non-MNEs
Movers to non-MNEs -.006 .000 .003 -.003
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.003)
Movers to MNEs .015∗ .015∗ .029∗ .012∗
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
N 335,017 335,017 581,784 581,784
R-sq. .42 .48 .34 .48
OLS Plant-FE OLS Plant-FE
Notes: Regressions include year and 28 industry dummies. Variables for plant and
individual characteristics are the same as indicated in the note to Table 3. ∗= significant
at 1 percent level. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
So far we have only seen how the movers were doing before moving, but movers may
be well paid relative to similar workers in their new plants, even though they may not
seem particularly selected from (or well-paid in) their old plants. I investigate this using
equation (3), but this time comparing wages of the movers after moving to wages of stayers
in the plants they are moving to. In these regressions I account for the length of tenure
in the plant prior to moving by replacing the dummy DMij in equation (3) with three
dummies; the first equal to 1 if tenure in the MNE prior to moving is less than 1 year,
the second capturing tenure of 1-3 years, and the third for workers with more than 3 years
of tenure in the MNE before moving. Similarly, the dummy DNij is replaced by three
dummies to capture the length of tenure in the non-MNE before moving.
The first two columns of Table 12 report the results for movers to non-MNEs.30 In
29 All regressions in Table 11 require the movers to be observed in their old plant 3 years before moving,
and the appropriate dummy applies for all these three years. (Similar results are obtained if the dummy
only applies the last year before moving.) In addition, I only include movers that are observed moving in
the indicated direction once during the period 1990-2000. For the stayers, I include only individuals that
never change plant within manufacturing, and require that they are observed at least 5 years. Thus the
wage regressions compare movers that were ‘relatively stable’ before moving to stayers that are ‘relatively
stable’.
30In a similar way as for the results in Table 11, the wage regressions presented in Table 12 are comparing
movers that are ‘relatively stable’ after moving to stayers that are ‘relatively stable’. See Footnote 29.
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Table 12: After moving: Wages of movers vs stayers in new plant
Movers to non-MNEs Movers to MNEs
Tenure from:
MNE, <1 y. .026∗ .010 -.010 -.009
(.007) (.006) (.006) (.006)
MNE, ∈(1,3 y.) .048∗ .038∗ .028∗ .028∗
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
MNE, >3 y. .059∗ .048∗ .051∗ .036∗
(.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
Non-MNE, <1 y. .009 -.007 -.019∗ -.021∗
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Non-MNE, ∈(1,3 y.) .030* .014* -.001 .003
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Non-MNE, >3 y. .026∗ .020∗ -.027∗ -.01
(.003) (.003) (.005) (.006)
N 592,856 592,856 345,725 345,725
R-sq. .34 .47 .42 .49
OLS Plant-FE OLS Plant-FE
Notes: Regressions include year and 28 industry dummies. Variables for plant
and individual characteristics are the same as indicated in the note to Table
3. ∗= significant at 1 percent level. Standard errors clustered on individuals
in parentheses.
the OLS results in Column 1, movers from MNEs to non-MNEs earn a wage premium
relative to the stayers in non-MNEs, and the wage premium increases with the length of
tenure from the MNE. In the fixed effect results of Column 2 there is no significant wage
premium for movers to non-MNEs with less than 1 year of tenure from the MNE prior to
moving, while the wage premium is 4.7% for workers with more than 3 years of tenure from
the MNE. This wage premium is more than double that of movers from other non-MNEs.
Thus, even though the results in Table 11 indicated no particular selection of workers from
MNEs to non-MNEs, these movers are clearly doing better than their colleagues in their
new plant.31 Results for movers to MNEs are presented in the last two columns of Table
12. For movers from non-MNEs to MNEs, no length of tenure in a non-MNE gives an
additional premium over and above tenure and experience in general. Thus, while the
results in Table 11 indicated that these workers are selected out of the non-MNEs, they
are not doing better than similar workers in their new plants. The evidence on the wages
31Similarly, Martins (2006) and Pesola (2006) find that previous tenure from foreign plants pays off after
moving to domestic plants.
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of movers from non-MNEs to MNEs is not consistent with a potential for spillovers from
non-MNEs to MNEs, as there is no extra effect of prior experience in non-MNEs on the
earnings of movers to MNEs.
7 Conclusions
The evidence provided in this paper is consistent with labour mobility from MNEs to
non-MNEs working as a channel for spillovers. First, as MNEs pay higher wages than
non-MNEs, this suggests that MNEs have a firm-specific advantage, and hence that there
is a potential for spillovers. Second, during the 1990s an increasing share of non-MNEs
employ workers with previous experience fromMNEs. Third, workers with MNE experience
contribute substantially to the productivity of their new plants. According to the estimates
in this paper, workers with MNE experience contribute 20-25% more to the productivity
of non-MNEs than workers without such experience. Thus, mobility is clearly a channel
for knowledge diffusion in Norwegian manufacturing. Fourth, it is in particular workers
moving from MNEs to non-MNEs that are rewarded in terms of higher wages in their
new plants. This private return to mobility is an indication that the hiring plants value
the knowledge these workers bring with them, and it is consistent with the productivity
effects found at the plant level. The wage premium for movers from MNEs to non-MNEs
with more than 3 years of experience from MNEs is almost 5% compared to stayers in
non-MNEs with similar characteristics. This 5% wage premium is far less than the 20-25%
‘productivity premium’ these workers have relative to workers without MNE experience in
non-MNEs. The difference in the wage premium and the productivity effect suggests that
the hiring non-MNEs do not fully pay for the value of the workers to the firm, and thus
labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs seems to be a source of knowledge externality
in Norwegian manufacturing.
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8 Appendix
Definition of variables used in the production function: Equation (2) in Section 5.
Lit Number of person hours in the plant. Rented labour hours are calculated from the
costs of rented labour using the calculated average wage for own employees. Since
only blue-collar hours are reported prior to 1983, and only total hours from 1983,
total hours before 1983 are estimated by using information on the blue-collar share
of the total wage bill.
Kit The estimate of capital services uses the following aggregation:
Kit = Rit + (0.07 + δ
m)V mit + (0.07 + δ
b)V bit,
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V
m
it and V
b
it are the estimated
values of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, δm = 0.06 and
δb = 0.02 are the depreciation rates. The rate of return to capital is taken to be 0.07.
The values for depreciation rates and the rate of return to capital are also used by
Salvanes and Førre (2003) using the same data. The estimated values of buildings
and machinery are obtained from information on fire insurance values. To reduce
noise and avoid discarding too many observations with missing fire insurance values,
these values are smoothed using the perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance
values are not recorded after 1995, thus from 1996 capital values are estimated by
adding investments and taking account of depreciation. Where possible, I also use
estimates of firm level capital values (distributed to the plant level according to
employment shares) as starting values for plants with entry after 1995. These capital
values are obtained from recent work to improve on capital estimates in Norwegian
manufacturing, see Raknerud et al. (2003). Separate price deflators for inputs and
output and for investment in buildings and machinery are obtained from Statistics
Norway. The aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the sector
classification used in the National Accounts, which is somewhere in between the 2-
and 3-digit ISIC level.
Mit Total cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes rented labour
and capital, I subtract these and allocate them to the labour and capital measures
respectively.
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Yit Gross production value net of sales taxes and subsidies.
The total factor productivity (TFP) index used in Row 9 of Table 9 is calculated at
the plant level as
lnTFPit = lnYit − αKt lnKit − αLt lnLit − αMt lnMit, (4)
where the αzt ’s are the 5-digit means of cost shares of each factor z relative to output Yit.
32
